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| YOUR BEST SOURCE FOR THE UNBIASED MARKET COMMENTARY YOU WON'T GET FROM WALL STREET | ||
by Martin D. Weiss, Ph.D.
For the first time in history, U.S. banks have suffered large, ominous losses in a giant sector that, until now, they thought was solid: bets on interest rates. In a moment, I'll explain what this means for your savings and your stocks. But first, here's the alarming news: According to the fourth quarter report just released this past Friday by the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), commercial banks lost a record $3.4 billion in interest rate derivatives, or more than seven times their worst previous quarterly loss in that category.1 And here's why the losses are so ominous: Until the third quarter of last year, the banks' losses in derivatives were almost entirely confined to credit default swaps — bets on failing companies and sinking investments.
But credit default swaps are actually a much smaller sector, representing only 7.8 percent of the total derivatives market. Now, with these new losses in interest rate derivatives, the disease has begun to infect a sector that encompasses a whopping 82 percent of the derivatives market.2 Thus, considering their far larger volume, any threat to interest rate derivatives could be far more serious than anything we've seen so far. Meanwhile, time bombs continue to explode in the credit default swaps as well, delivering another massive loss of nearly $9 billion in the fourth quarter. And remember: These represent the aggregate total for the entire banking industry, after netting out the results of banks with profitable trading. Why This Crisis Could Be Nearly as Yes, I know the standard argument: In 1929, bank regulation and depositor protection was primarily run by state governments. Now, with the FDIC, the OCC, and more direct Federal Reserve intervention, it's far more centralized. But offsetting that strength are serious weaknesses in the banking system that did not exist in the 1930s: • In 1929, there were fewer giant banks. They controlled a smaller share of the total market. And they were generally stronger than the thousands of community banks around the country. Today, by contrast, the nation's high-roller megabanks dominate the market. • In 1929, derivatives were virtually nonexistent. Not today! U.S. banks alone control $200.4 trillion; and it's precisely in this dangerous sector that the megabanks dominate the most.
According to the OCC's Q4 2008 report, America's top five commercial banks control 96 percent of the industry's total derivatives, while the top 25 control 99.78 percent. In other words, for every $100 dollar of derivatives, the big banks have $99.78 ... while the rest of the nation's 7,000-plus banking institutions control a meager 22 cents!3 This is a massively dangerous concentration of risk. The large banks are exposed to the danger that buyers will vanish, markets will suddenly become illiquid, and they'll be unable to unload their positions without accepting wipe-out losses. Has this ever happened? Unfortunately, yes. In fact, it's the primary reason they lost a record $3.4 billion in the last three months of 2008. The large banks are exposed to the danger that, with exploding federal deficits and new fears of inflation, interest rates will suddenly surge, delivering a whole new round of even bigger losses in the months ahead. Worst of all, the five biggest banks are exposed to breathtaking default risk — the danger that their trading partners could fail to make good on their gambling debts, transforming even the best winning trades into some of the worst losers. Here's our chart on these risks, updated to reflect the new data just released on Friday:
Specifically, at year-end 2008,
What's excessive? The banking regulators won't tell us. But as a rule, exposure of more than 25 percent in any one major risk area is too much, in my view. And if you think these four banks are overexposed, wait till you see the super-high roller that the OCC has just added to its quarterly reports: Goldman Sachs.
The folks at Goldman think they're smart, and they are. They say they can handle large risks, and usually they can. But not in a sinking global economy! And not when the exposure reaches such stratospheric extremes! Major Impact on the Stock Market In the 1930s, the banking crisis helped drive the economy into depression and the stock market into its worst decline of the century. The same is happening today. Whether the nation's big banks are bailed out by the federal government or not, the fact remains that they're jacking up credit standards, squeezing off credit lines, and even shutting down major segments of their lending operations. And regardless of how much lawmakers try to arm-twist banks to lend more, it's rarely happening. With scant exceptions, bank capital has been reduced, sometimes decimated. The risk of lending has gone through the roof. And many of the more prudent borrowers don't even want bank loans to begin with. Those credit shortages, both acute and chronic, have a big impact on the economy and the stock market. Moreover, unlike the 1930s, banks themselves are publicly traded companies whose shares make up a substantial portion of the S&P 500. The big lesson to be learned: Don't pooh-pooh comparisons between today's bear market and the deep bear market of 1929-32. From its peak in 1929, the Dow Jones Industrials Average fell 89 percent. Compared to the Dow's peak in 2007, that would be tantamount to a plunge of more than 12,600 points — to a low of approximately 1500, or an additional 81 percent decline from the Friday's 7776. Even a decline of half that magnitude would still leave the Dow well below the 5000 level, which remains our current target. Does this preclude sharp rallies? Absolutely not! From its recent March 6 bottom to last week's peak, the Dow has already jumped a resounding 21 percent in just 20 short days. And the rally may still not be over. But this is nothing unusual. In the 1929-32 period, the Dow enjoyed even sharper rallies, and those rallies did nothing to end the great bear market. My father, who made a fortune shorting stocks in that period, explains it this way:
Your approach today should be similar. Specifically, Step 1. Keep as much as 90 percent of your money SAFE, as follows:
Step 2. If you missed the opportunity to greatly reduce your exposure to the stock market in 2007 or 2008, you now have another chance. And the more the market rises from here, the more you should sell. Step 3. If you are still exposed to stock market declines, seriously consider inverse ETFs, ideal for helping you hedge against that risk. (For more background information, see my 2007 report, How to Protect Your Stock Portfolio From the Spreading Credit Crunch.) Step 4. If you have funds you can afford to risk, seriously consider two major profit opportunities in the months ahead:
Good luck and God bless! Martin 1 For the banks' $3.42 billion loss in interest rate derivatives, see OCC's Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities Fourth Quarter 2008, table at the bottom of pdf page 17, "Cash & Derivative Revenue," line 1. As you can see, that was 7.2 times larger than the previous record — the fourth quarter of 2004, when the nation's banks lost $472 million in interest rate derivatives. 2 See OCC table at the bottom of pdf page 11, "Derivative Contracts by Type." In it, the OCC reports total U.S. bank-held derivatives of $200,382 billion at year-end 2008. Among these, the single largest category is interest rate derivatives, representing $164,404 billion, or 82 percent of the total. In contrast, credit derivatives are only $15,897 billion, or 7.93 percent of the total. Within the credit derivative category, the OCC reports (page 1, fourth bullet) that nearly all — 98 percent — are credit default swaps, which have proven to be the most toxic and damaging category of derivatives so far. But they represent only 7.77 percent of all derivatives (7.93 percent x 98 percent). 3 OCC. In Table 1, pdf page 22, "Notional Amount of Derivatives Contracts." 4 OCC, table at bottom of pdf page 13. About Money and Markets For more information and archived issues, visit http://www.moneyandmarkets.com Money and Markets (MaM) is published by Weiss Research, Inc. and written by Martin D. Weiss along with Tony Sagami, Nilus Mattive, Sean Brodrick, Larry Edelson, Michael Larson and Jack Crooks. To avoid conflicts of interest, Weiss Research and its staff do not hold positions in companies recommended in MaM, nor do we accept any compensation for such recommendations. The comments, graphs, forecasts, and indices published in MaM are based upon data whose accuracy is deemed reliable but not guaranteed. Performance returns cited are derived from our best estimates but must be considered hypothetical in as much as we do not track the actual prices investors pay or receive. Regular contributors and staff include Kristen Adams, Andrea Baumwald, John Burke, Amber Dakar, Dinesh Kalera, Red Morgan, Maryellen Murphy, Jennifer Newman-Amos, Adam Shafer, Julie Trudeau, Jill Umiker, Leslie Underwood and Michelle Zausnig. Attention editors and publishers! Money and Markets issues can be republished. Republished issues MUST include attribution of the author(s) and the following short paragraph:
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